Completes T14: the two CI pipelines that need Pulumi stack state, which
bootstrap/state/ is gitignored from. Solves the blocker by publishing a
fresh `pulumi stack export` to RustFS after every `up`, then having CI
pull + import it.
- state-publish.sh: ships the stack export to rfs/foundation-ci-state/
foundation-stack.json via a throwaway mc container on foundation-net
(ADR-007), exactly like backup.sh. Secrets inside the export stay
passphrase-encrypted; config travels in the committed (encrypted)
Pulumi.foundation.yaml. run.sh invokes it best-effort after `up`.
- rustfs.ts + Pulumi.foundation.yaml: declare the foundation-ci-state
bucket (created belt-and-suspenders by state-publish on first run).
- pulumi-preview.yml (push/PR): read-only drift/PR check. Pulls + imports
state, materializes the operator key from the SSH_PRIVATE_KEY secret
(the provider + index.ts read it), `pulumi preview` — never `up`. A diff
is informational so the job fails only on a program/preview error.
- backup-verify.yml (weekly + dispatch): reuses backup.sh/restore.sh
unchanged to produce a bundle and restore-verify it from offsite
(CONTRACT_004 §4.6). Imports real state so the bundle's pulumi-state.json
is real, not an empty deployment.
Repo-scoped Actions secrets set via the admin API: PULUMI_CONFIG_PASSPHRASE,
SSH_PRIVATE_KEY, RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY, RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY. Both pipelines
validated end-to-end in a foundation-ci container on the VM (preview exit 0;
backup-verify RESTORE VERIFY PASS from offsite).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Close the known gap: backup bundles were uploaded unencrypted, relying
solely on destination access control. Now every data artifact is
age-encrypted on the VM before upload and decrypted on restore.
- backup-remote.sh: assemble rustfs blobs into rustfs-blobs.tar.zst (so the
whole bundle is one encrypted unit), then age -r <recipient> each artifact
to <name>.age and drop the plaintext. MANIFEST.json stays cleartext — it
is the inventory + integrity gate and carries no secrets; it records each
artifact's PLAINTEXT sha256 so restore verifies after decrypt.
- restore-remote.sh: materialise the age identity to a 0600 file, decrypt
each .age, then run the existing sha + scratch-restore asserts; add a
rustfs-blobs extract+assert.
- backup.sh / restore.sh: pass the public recipient (arg) / secret identity
(stdin, never argv) from passphrase-encrypted config.
- provision/index.ts: install age + zstd on the VM via cloud-init so a fresh
DR VM (T13) has the backup tools from first boot.
- Pulumi.foundation.yaml: seed backup.ageRecipient (public) + backup.ageIdentity
(secure:). The identity lives in config so {repo + passphrase} can decrypt a
bundle even after total Vault loss (CONTRACT_004 §4.3).
Validated live: encrypted backup + restore-verify PASS from both RustFS and
offsite; bucket shows only *.age + cleartext MANIFEST.json.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
foundation-vault (hashicorp/vault:1.18, digest-pinned) with integrated raft
storage in foundation-vault-data (-> /vault/file, which the entrypoint chowns to
the vault user), IPC_LOCK for mlock, internal only (8200 unpublished). Init +
unseal reuse the olsitec-core pattern but over docker-exec/SSH (ADR-007): the
foundation-vault-init command inits 1-of-1 Shamir, unseals, and emits keys + root
token on stdout — marked secret and NOT streamed (logging:Stderr) so they never
reach the terminal/logs (D2). run.sh captures them into vaultCredentials:* (the
one bootstrap secret that cannot live in Vault, CONTRACT_002 §2.4) with an
idempotent guard that avoids churning the config. vault-unseal.sh is the
passphrase-gated reboot helper (ADR-004): reads keys from config, unseals over an
SSH stdin pipe. run.sh also now pins the Pulumi backend per-process
(PULUMI_BACKEND_URL) instead of a global `pulumi login`.
Live on cx33 Helsinki: initialized + unsealed (raft 1.18.5), keys captured to
encrypted config, idempotent re-up reuses stored keys, container-restart reseal
recovered by vault-unseal.sh. Acceptance T05 met.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Bun workspaces (packages/* + bootstrap); Pulumi nodejs runtime under
packagemanager: bun (no npm fallback needed).
- bootstrap/config.ts: typed FoundationConfig per CONTRACT_001; loadConfig()
fails closed, aggregating all missing+malformed keys in one error. Reads flat
dotted keys; image digests excluded (they live in VERSIONS, D5).
- bootstrap/Pulumi.foundation.yaml: non-secret placeholders only (RFC-5737 vm.host,
.invalid offsite); no encryptionsalt/secrets committed (D2). pulumi preview = 0
resources under the passphrase provider via gitignored file:// state backend.
- Stage-1 vendoring: packages/pulumi-{docker,vault} as @olsitec/* (source-only,
logic unchanged). vault's 5 type-only imports from modules/olsitec re-homed
verbatim into pulumi-vault/olsitec-types.ts to keep the egg self-contained.
Realizes PLAN-002 §10 T02; ADR-005 / 000_TOPOLOGY.md §5 Stage-1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
