// components/runner.ts  (T10)
//
// foundation-runner — a Forgejo Actions runner (CONTRACT_003 §3.2). Registration
// is idempotent (ADR-007): if the persistent /data/.runner config already exists it
// is reused; otherwise a fresh registration token is minted with
// `forgejo actions generate-runner-token` and consumed by `forgejo-runner register`
// (the token never leaves the VM). The daemon then polls Forgejo for jobs.
//
// SECURITY (PLAN-002 R5 / PLAN-001 §4a): this runner shares the VM and is given the
// host Docker socket so `docker`-label jobs can spawn containers — i.e. it is
// root-equivalent on the host and is NOT fenced from the forge's trust boundary.
// That is the documented day-zero compromise; the steady-state is a throwaway,
// separate privileged runner VM. Do not run untrusted workflows here until fenced.
import * as pulumi from "@pulumi/pulumi";
import * as docker from "@pulumi/docker";
import * as command from "@pulumi/command";
import { DeployCtx } from "../lib/context";
import { vmConnection } from "../lib/remote";
import { ForgejoOutputs } from "./forgejo";

export interface RunnerOutputs {
  container: docker.Container;
  registered: command.remote.Command;
}

export function deployRunner(
  ctx: DeployCtx,
  forgejo: ForgejoOutputs,
): RunnerOutputs {
  const { cfg, provider, network } = ctx;
  const img = ctx.image("ACT_RUNNER");
  const labels = cfg.runner.labels.join(",");

  const image = new docker.RemoteImage(
    "foundation-runner-image",
    { name: img, keepLocally: true },
    { provider },
  );
  const volume = new docker.Volume(
    "foundation-runner-data",
    { name: "foundation-runner-data" },
    { provider, retainOnDelete: true }, // holds .runner registration secret
  );

  const register = new command.remote.Command(
    "foundation-runner-register",
    {
      connection: vmConnection(ctx),
      create: pulumi.interpolate`set -eu
VOL=foundation-runner-data
IMG='${img}'
LABELS='${labels}'
docker volume inspect "$VOL" >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker volume create "$VOL" >/dev/null
if docker run --rm --entrypoint sh -v "$VOL":/data "$IMG" -c '[ -s /data/.runner ]'; then
  echo "runner already registered"
else
  TOKEN=$(docker exec -u git foundation-forgejo forgejo actions generate-runner-token)
  docker run --rm --network foundation-net --entrypoint /bin/forgejo-runner -v "$VOL":/data "$IMG" \\
    register --no-interactive --instance http://foundation-forgejo:3000 --token "$TOKEN" --name foundation-runner --labels "$LABELS" >/dev/null
  echo "runner registered"
fi`,
      addPreviousOutputInEnv: false,
      triggers: [forgejo.ready.id, labels],
    },
    { dependsOn: [forgejo.ready] },
  );

  const container = new docker.Container(
    "foundation-runner",
    {
      name: "foundation-runner",
      image: image.imageId,
      hostname: "foundation-runner",
      restart: "unless-stopped",
      entrypoints: ["/bin/forgejo-runner"],
      command: ["daemon"],
      // The image runs as uid 1000; add the host docker group (gid of
      // /var/run/docker.sock) so the daemon can reach the socket without running
      // as root. NOTE: 996 is THIS host's docker gid — re-check on DR to a new VM
      // (`stat -c %g /var/run/docker.sock`). Socket access is root-equivalent
      // regardless (see the security note above).
      groupAdds: ["996"],
      envs: ["DOCKER_HOST=unix:///var/run/docker.sock"],
      volumes: [
        { volumeName: volume.name, containerPath: "/data" },
        {
          hostPath: "/var/run/docker.sock",
          containerPath: "/var/run/docker.sock",
        },
      ],
      networksAdvanced: [{ name: network.name, aliases: ["foundation-runner"] }],
      logDriver: "json-file",
      logOpts: { "max-size": "10m", "max-file": "3" },
    },
    {
      provider,
      dependsOn: [network, register],
      deleteBeforeReplace: true,
    },
  );

  return { container, registered: register };
}