Andreas Niemann
92e8f978a5
Close the known gap: backup bundles were uploaded unencrypted, relying
solely on destination access control. Now every data artifact is
age-encrypted on the VM before upload and decrypted on restore.
- backup-remote.sh: assemble rustfs blobs into rustfs-blobs.tar.zst (so the
whole bundle is one encrypted unit), then age -r <recipient> each artifact
to <name>.age and drop the plaintext. MANIFEST.json stays cleartext — it
is the inventory + integrity gate and carries no secrets; it records each
artifact's PLAINTEXT sha256 so restore verifies after decrypt.
- restore-remote.sh: materialise the age identity to a 0600 file, decrypt
each .age, then run the existing sha + scratch-restore asserts; add a
rustfs-blobs extract+assert.
- backup.sh / restore.sh: pass the public recipient (arg) / secret identity
(stdin, never argv) from passphrase-encrypted config.
- provision/index.ts: install age + zstd on the VM via cloud-init so a fresh
DR VM (T13) has the backup tools from first boot.
- Pulumi.foundation.yaml: seed backup.ageRecipient (public) + backup.ageIdentity
(secure:). The identity lives in config so {repo + passphrase} can decrypt a
bundle even after total Vault loss (CONTRACT_004 §4.3).
Validated live: encrypted backup + restore-verify PASS from both RustFS and
offsite; bucket shows only *.age + cleartext MANIFEST.json.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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| .. | ||
| components | ||
| lib | ||
| config.ts | ||
| index.ts | ||
| package.json | ||
| Pulumi.foundation.yaml | ||
| Pulumi.yaml | ||
| run.sh | ||
| tsconfig.json | ||
| vault-unseal.sh | ||